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Lengthy Minimum Parole Requirements:
A Denial of Hope
Heather Walker1

I. Introduction
In 2012, the Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama2 that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole were unconstitutional for juveniles. In response to this decision, Iowa Governor
Terry Branstand decided to commute thirty-eight juveniles’ sentences within his state.3 While the decision was originally seen as
a potentially positive move for juvenile rehabilitation, it quickly
became clear that the decision was anything but positive. Branstand commuted the thirty-eight life sentences without potential
parole to merely life sentences with the possibility of parole at sixty
years.4 This would mean that a fifteen-year-old who had their sentence commuted in this way would not receive an opportunity for
parole until they were seventy-five. How could this decision honor the
Court’s recognition that denying juveniles an opportunity for parole
1
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violates their constitutional rights? Is there any meaningful difference between life with the possibility of parole at seventy-five or
life without parole when the average lifespan in the United States
is seventy-eight years? This is a relevant concern, especially given
that people in prison have shorter lifespans than the national average. In fact, in one study of New York parolees, researchers found
that for every additional year a person was in prison, there was an
average two year decrease in life expectancy.5 Eventually, the Iowa
State Court found that this commutation did not honor the precedent
set by the Supreme Court, and when the Supreme Court held that
its 2012 decision was retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the
people who had been sentenced as juveniles were able to appeal for
an opportunity for release.6
The Supreme Court’s past precedent on juvenile justice has left
important gaps in the types of sentences that are permissible for
juveniles. In Graham v Florida,7 the Court expressly banned life
sentences without the possibility of parole for non-homicide juvenile
offenders. In Miller,8 the Court also banned mandatory life sentences
without the possibility of parole for any juvenile offender regardless of whether the offense was a non-homicide or homicide offense.
These two cases do not answer every question though. In fact, even
Branstand’s order was not explicitly against Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, legal scholars, attorneys, and lower courts have
all considered whether bans on life sentences without parole also
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include term of years sentences.9 For example, if someone is sentenced to 100 years in prison without the possibility of parole, is that
excluded under the Supreme Court’s precedent even though it is not
specifically life without parole? Legal scholars have also looked at
parole systems throughout the United States to see if they align with
the discretionary requirement articulated in Miller for juvenile sentencing.10 Though legal scholarship on juvenile justice abounds, relatively little work has been done on how the minimum amount of time
before a juvenile has a chance for parole affects the constitutionality
of a sentence. People collectively raised concerns with Branstand’s
decision to only allow for parole at sixty years, but States like Texas
and Colorado still allow courts to sentence non-homicide juvenile
offenders to lengthy terms in prison with their first opportunity for
parole being at forty years.
The Supreme Court should extend its reasoning in Graham and
Miller to hold that lengthy minimum parole requirements are unconstitutional for juvenile non-homicide offenders. To honor this decision, the Court should adopt a categorical rule that non-homicide
juvenile offenders should be given the possibility of parole before
thirty years. I begin by presenting the Supreme Court’s past decisions regarding juvenile justice and the sentencing scheme at issue.
Then, I articulate the reasoning in Graham and Miller and apply
it to lengthy minimum parole requirements for juvenile non-homicide offenders, illustrating how and why lengthy minimum parole
requirements are unconstitutional for non-homicide juvenile offenders. Lastly, I address why the Court should adopt a categorical rule
9
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stating that minimum parole requirements that are thirty years or
greater are unconstitutional for non-homicidal juvenile offenders.

II. Background
Juvenile sentencing under the Eighth Amendment has been shaped
by three landmark cases. Together, these cases represent the meaningful precedent for understanding the constitutionality of any juvenile sentencing scheme. In Roper v Simmons,11 the Court ruled that
the death penalty was unconstitutional for juvenile offenders. In
Graham,12 the Court ruled that life in prison without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional. In Miller,13 the Court held that
mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole was to be
unconstitutional. To understand the legal argument around lengthy
minimum parole requirements, a history of these cases is necessary.
A. Roper v Simmons
In 2005, the Court ruled that the death penalty for juvenile offenders
under eighteen years old was unconstitutional.14 The Court acknowledged juveniles as constitutionally different than adults and ordered
that this must be reflected in sentencing. This distinction rested on
three main points. First, juveniles “lack maturity and have an undeveloped sense of responsibility.”15 Because of this lack of maturity
as compared to adults, juveniles are much more likely to engage in
rash, reckless, and ill-advised behavior. In fact, the Court cited social
science research showing that those under eighteen were statistically
overrepresented in almost every category of reckless behavior.16
Second, juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
11
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influences and outside pressures, including peer pressures.’’17 This
Court specifically pointed out the importance of this fact given that
juveniles have less control over their environment.18 Lastly, juveniles’
character and personality traits are not fully formed. Because of the
unique nature of childhood, “the personality traits of juveniles are
more transitory, less fixed.”19 When looking at these facts together,
these differences “demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with
reliability be classified among the worst offenders,” and thus should
be exempt from punishments reserved for the worst offenders.20
B. Graham v Florida
In 2009, the Court extended their rationale regarding the differences
in juvenile offenders to rule that sentencing non-homicidal juvenile
offenders to life without the possibility for parole (LWOP) is unconstitutional.21 The Court affirmed that an “offender’s age is relevant
to the Eighth Amendment, and that criminal procedure laws that
fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed.”22 They held that because juveniles are less culpable, nonhomicidal crimes are less severe, and the “sentence lack[ed] any
legitimate penological justification” sentencing juveniles to LWOP
for non-homicide offenses is unconstitutional.23 Additionally, this
sentencing scheme did not offer juveniles who had changed later in
life a meaningful opportunity for release. This case also introduced
an important distinction in juvenile law between homicidal and
non-homicidal offenses. The court defined non-homicidal crimes as
those where a defendant “[does] not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that
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life will be taken.”24 People who commit non-homicidal crimes “are
categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment
than are murderers.”25
C. Miller v Alabama
The Court heard a challenge to the constitutionality of mandatory
LWOP sentences for juveniles in 2012. Using the legal precedent in
Roper and Graham, and extending concerns about mandatory sentencing schemes, the Court held that mandatory LWOP for juveniles
is unconstitutional.26 This does not mean that juveniles cannot be
sentenced to LWOP, but instead that the “state’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not
children.”27 This means that courts must take into account the mitigating nature of age when sentencing juveniles. Subsequently, LWOP
should be very rare and only for the most incorrigible of offenders.28
The Court again articulated the idea that juveniles should be offered
a meaningful opportunity for release as first discussed in Graham.
D. Current State of Juvenile Law and Types of Challenges
Together, these cases suggest three important things in understanding whether a sentencing scheme for juveniles is constitutional. First,
juveniles are constitutionally different than adults. These differences
make them less culpable and subsequently less deserving of harsh
punishment. Sentencing schemes that do not honor the unique status
of juveniles are unconstitutional. Second, the severity of the offense
also matters in whether a sentence is justified. The types of crimes
that justify capital punishment are different than crimes that warrant
less severe responses. Namely, more severe crimes, such as homicidal
24
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crimes, warrant more severe punishment. Lastly, sentences that lack
a legitimate penological purpose are unconstitutional.
These cases also bring up an important distinction in the legal
argument against lengthy mandatory minimum parole requirements.
The Court has identified two different types of legal challenges for
sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. The first is length of term
challenges. These challenges are not concerned with the actual sentencing law, but simply that the court applied in a disproportionate
way to the offender in question.29 For example, in Solem v. Helm,30
the Court held that LWOP was a disproportionate sentence for the
defendant’s seventh nonviolent felony of passing a worthless check.
They did not challenge LWOP sentences but simply that it was a
disproportionate sentence for the crime. The second type of challenges are categorical challenges. Categorical claims are concerns
with the sentencing law itself. These challengers seek categorical
remedies against the sentencing scheme. All three cases above represent examples of categorical claims. Another example is Atkins v.
Virginia31 where the Court held that sentencing schemes that allowed
for people with intellectual disabilities to be sentenced to death were
unconstitutional. Here they are arguing against the law or scheme,
not the application.
Categorical claims hinge on two dimensions. First, the nature
of the offense, and second, the nature of the offender. If the nature
of the offense is less severe, then it requires a less severe punishment. The Court ruling that capital punishment for non-homicide
crimes is unconstitutional is an example of this because the nature of
the offense was not severe enough to warrant such a severe punishment.32 Regarding the nature of the offender, the Court held that the
diminished culpability of various defendants warrants less severe
punishment. In Atkins, the Court held that the death penalty was

29

Graham, 560 U.S.

30

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)

31

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 14 (2002)

32

Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 35, 2021

214

unconstitutional for mentally disabled offenders.33 As the challenge
to lengthy minimum parole requirements is a categorical claim, the
legal analysis rests broadly with the nature of the offense and the
nature of the offender.
E. Lengthy Parole Requirements
To understand the legal argument against lengthy minimum parole
requirements, there must be a clear definition. Parole, like sentencing,
is determined on a state-by-state basis. This means that there is variety in sentencing and parole schemes. Some states, like Michigan,34
require juvenile consideration of parole ten years after sentencing.
Other states, like Colorado,35 have schemes that allow for parole only
after forty years of the juvenile’s sentence has already been served.
This sentencing scheme means that a juvenile could have their earliest opportunity for release when they are in their late fifties. At this
age, they are well past the typical time to build a career, have children, and get married. In effect, these requirements deny juvenile
offenders their life regardless of whether they are released later. Graham36 and Miller37 require that there be a “meaningful opportunity
for release,” and while the Court does not explicitly define this term,
lengthy minimum parole requirements deny juveniles that option.
Though there is some ambiguity in the exact definition of what constitutes a lengthy minimum parole requirement, for this argument,
we will define lengthy minimum parole requirements as anything
over thirty years. As stated above, not allowing parole before thirty
years means most juveniles sentenced under these schemes will not
have a chance for release until they are over fifty years old.

33
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III. Criteria for determining Constitutionality as
Understood in Graham and Applied in Miller
As mentioned above, the Court views categorical claims on two
dimensions: the nature of the offense and the nature of the offender.
Within these two dimensions, the Court applied a two-step approach
when determining the constitutionality of LWOP for non-homicide
offenses in Graham. The Court used this same approach in Miller.
As this is another categorical juvenile sentencing case case under the
Eighth Amendment, which outlaws cruel and unusual punishment,
this analysis will take the same approach as the Court in both previous cases.
In both Graham and Miller, the Court first looked to “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice”38 to determine that national consensus on
the statute in question. Next, “guided by the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning
and purpose”39 the Court exercised its own independent judgment
about whether the statute violates the Constitution. The second part
of this approach is the Court’s recognition of the fact that the “task
of interpreting the 8th amendment remains [their] responsibility.”40
The Court’s analysis on the second point centers on culpability of
the offender, the severity of the crime, and the practical penological
purposes.
A. “Objective indicia of society’s standards”
The Court’s first step in Graham and Miller was looking at society’s view of the sentencing scheme. Eighth Amendment case law
is unique in that instead of viewing cruel and unusual through a
historical prism, the Court is concerned with “the evolving standards
38
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of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”41 This is
because what was cruel and unusual in the past is different from
what is cruel and unusual now. Scalia gave the example of public
lashing and branding. Both were forms of colonial punishment,
and at the time of ratification, neither punishment would have been
considered cruel or unusual. Nonetheless, today those punishments
would be both.42 Given this standard, the question then becomes
how to determine “evolving standards of decency.”43 In Atkins, the
Court held that “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence
of contemporary values is in the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”44 By looking at the legislative status across the country,
the Court can determine if there is a national consensus against its use.
The first step is to look at the base acceptability under statute.
Namely, how many states allow for the type of sentencing in question. This was the standard used in Roper. Only a small set of states
allowed juveniles to be sentence to death, and there was a clear
trend in rejecting the death penalty for juveniles. The Court used
this information to rule that there was national consensus against
its use. Legislative permissibility is not enough on its own, though.
In Graham, “thirty-seven states as well as the District of Columbia
allowed for life without parole for a juvenile non-homicide offender
in some way.”45 Even as such, the Court held that the argument that
this showed no national consensus against the practice was “incomplete and unavailing.”46 The Court made a similar judgment in Miller.47 It determined that having twenty-nine jurisdictions that allowed
mandatory life sentences for juveniles was not by itself sufficient to

41

Estelle v Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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prove that there was not a national consensus against the sentencing.48
In both cases, the Court looked past simply counting the number of
states that allowed that sentencing to see whether that sentencing was
endorsed by looking at the actual application of the sentencing scheme.
This same reasoning applies to lengthy minimum parole requirements for non-homicide juvenile offenders. While it is a little unclear
how many states allow for lengthy minimum parole options, as
shown in Graham and Miller, this is not the only concern. The number could potentially be as high as the thirty-seven states in Graham49
and alone it would still not be convincing. What is convincing here is
the actual sentencing practices. Only three states have express provisions that allow for or require that a minimum parole requirement be
thirty years or longer for non-homicide offenses, so only three states
have expressly endorsed this sentencing for juveniles. Like in the
previous cases, with only three states having express provisions, this
cannot equate to the actual endorsement needed to signify a national
consensus for its use.
Furthermore, in both Graham and Miller, the Court recognized
that the possibility of the sentencing in question was not necessarily
an affirmative judgment on that type of sentencing. This is especially
true in juvenile justice cases. For example, the sentencing schemes
in Graham and Miller were allowed only because juveniles could be
tried as adults and adults could be sentenced in that way. While the
rules made these sentences “possible for some non-juvenile offenders” the Court held that they “did not justify a judgment that many
States intended to subject such offenders to” these sentences because
they were intended for adults.50 The Court recognized this again in
Miller, concluding again that “it was impossible to say whether a
legislature has endorsed a given penalty”51 just because that sentencing was possible.

48
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Again, this is relevant when considering lengthy minimum
parole requirements for juvenile non-homicide offenders. The states,
excluding the three with express provisions allowing this type of
sentencing, that allow for the earliest opportunity for parole to be
thirty years or later are a product of juveniles being transferred to
adult court and courts being allowed to sentence adults in this way.
As acknowledged in Graham and reaffirmed in Miller, this does
not equate to affirmative judgment on lengthy minimum parole
requirements.
Considering the low level of express affirmation for this sentencing scheme both in application and in practice, there is no clear
national consensus in favor of lengthy minimum parole requirements. Furthermore, ten states have express requirements that the
maximum time before an opportunity for parole must be less than
twenty-five years for non-homicide juvenile offenders. When comparing the three states with express support for lengthy minimum
parole requirements to the ten states having expressed disapproval of
the sentencing scheme, there is a national consensus against it. Altogether, using the reasoning of evolving standards first articulated in
Trop v. Dulles52 and reaffirmed specifically for juveniles in Graham
and Miller, there is a national consensus against lengthy minimum
parole requirements for juvenile non-homicide offenses.
B. “Task of interpreting the 8th Amendment remains our
responsibility”
National consensus is not the only factor the Court uses to determine
the constitutionality of sentencing schemes under the Eighth Amendment. The Court has also acknowledged their own role in interpreting and applying the Constitution. Justice Kennedy addressed this
in Graham when he wrote, “in accordance with the constitutional
design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our
responsibility.’”53 In interpreting the Eighth Amendment, the Court
has considered three main factors: the culpability of the offender, the
52
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severity of the crime, and whether the punishment serves a practical
penological purpose. For lengthy minimum parole requirements, all
three factors weigh in favor of finding the practice unconstitutional.
Thus, the Court should hold that lengthy minimum parole requirements are unconstitutional.
C. Culpability
Culpability is how responsible someone is for their crime. It changes
how one is punished and the justification of the punishment. In
considering the constitutionality of a sentencing scheme under the
Eighth Amendment, the Court is very interested in the culpability of
the offender. In fact, in Atkins54 it was the diminished culpability of
mentally disabled people that made sentencing them to death cruel
and unusual. In Graham, Kennedy set out two considerations when
looking at culpability under the Eighth Amendment for juveniles:
“The age of the offender and the nature of the crime.”55 In other
words, when looking at the constitutionality of juvenile sentencing,
the Court must consider the age and the type of crime they committed.
When looking at the age of the offender, Roper lays out the relevant points. These have since been affirmed in both Graham and
Miller. In Roper, the Court solidified that there is a constitutional difference between adults and children in their level of culpability. This
difference hinges on three considerations. First, “lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young.”56 Second, juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures.”57 Lastly, “the character
of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult” and “the personality traits of juveniles are more transitory and less fixed.”58 The
54
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Court acknowledged that all these factors meant that juveniles are
less culpable for their actions. “Once the diminished culpability of
juveniles is recognized” sentencing must reflect that diminished culpability.59 Graham echoed this stating that a juvenile is not absolved
of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression “is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”60 As the Justices pointed out in
Miller, the distinctive characteristics of juveniles are not sentencing specific.61 All three points hold regardless of the sentencing
scheme in practice. This means that this analysis holds when considering lengthy minimum parole requirements for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
The second thing the Court considers when looking at culpability is the severity of the crime. In Graham, the Court reiterated
that they have “recognized that defendants who do not kill, intend to
kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are murderers.”62
This reflects a line between non-homicidal and homicidal crimes.
This is due in part to the permanence of homicidal crimes. There
is something irreversible and irrevocable about taking a life. Nonhomicidal crimes differ in both the severity and permanence from
homicidal crimes and thus “those crimes differ from homicide
crimes in a moral sense.”63 Together with juveniles’ differences due
to age, the Court held that “...when compared to an adult murderer,
a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability.”64 This analysis is the same when considering lengthy minimum parole requirements because this paper
is only concerned with this issue for non-homicide offenses. Where
the analysis regarding the characteristics of juveniles and the crime
is the same as in Graham and Miller, it follows that the results should
59
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be the same as well. Namely, that juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses have “twice diminished moral culpability” and that
must be reflected in sentencing.
D. Severity of Punishment
The next thing the Court considers is the severity of the punishment. In Roper, the Court acknowledged that the death penalty was
an especially severe punishment. The death penalty could not be
revoked. If the state made the wrong choice, they could not redress
that mistake. In Graham, the Court established that, while still different from death sentences, “life without parole sentences share
some characteristics with death sentences.”65 Without parole, there is
no opportunity for release barring executive clemency. This means
that “the sentence alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable.”66 No amount of good behavior or character change or
rehabilitation will matter because they will spend the rest of their
days in prison. As the Court said, it “means a denial of hope.”67 The
Court held that this was especially severe for juveniles as “under this
sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a
greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.”68
This is the place where the argument against lengthy parole
minimums requirements begins to differ from previous precedent.
Lengthy parole minimums are neither LWOP nor death sentences.
They are less severe sentences, but like both of those sentencing
schemes, there is a denial of hope. Consider the juvenile who at 16 is
sentenced in Texas. Under Texas’ current sentencing scheme, where
the first opportunity for parole is after forty years, that juvenile’s first
chance of release would be at 56 years old. They would have missed
the time to have a family, the time to have a job, and the time to get
an education. This is assuming they are even released. This sentence
65
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denies the ability to change “without giving hope of restoration.”69 It
takes the most fruitful years of a person’s life, and in doing so commits a harm with an irrevocability similar to that in Graham and
Roper. Again, the sentence is especially severe for juveniles. The
16-year-old in Texas would never have a chance to finish high school
or get their first job. Juveniles liek this are sentenced as children
with very little skills and only released as older citizens with little
opportunity for hope. While it is true that these arguments apply
equally well to a someone who is eighteen and as such falls out of
the technical definition of juveniles, the Court has engaged in this
distinction throughout the precedent regarding juvenile. The break
was eighteen for the death penalty even though there is little one can
do to say how an eighteen-year-old is distinctly different. This justification depends on consistency. The courts have used this age to
determine juvenile status throughout the United States. While it may
present problems, courts must draw the line somewhere.
E. Practical Penological Purposes
The Court also recognized that “the penological justifications for
the sentencing practice are also relevant”70 in determining whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual. The Court acknowledged that it is
the legislature’s job to determine which justification for punishment
is most salient and how to implement that punishment. While this is
true, it does not mean that “the purposes and effects of penal sanctions are irrelevant to the determination” of constitutionality under
the Eighth Amendment.71 The goal of the Court is not to determine
the best justification for punishment or how to apply that justification. Instead, the question is whether there is any legitimate penological purpose because “a sentence lacking any legitimate penological
justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.”72 The
69
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four justifications that the Court has considered in past cases are
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.73
Retributivists justify punishment under the idea that people
should be held accountable for their crimes simply because they
committed them.74 The Court described retributivism as the ability to “express condemnation of the crime and seek restoration of
the moral imbalance caused by the offense.”75 Central to retributivism is the idea of culpability. As already acknowledged, culpability is categorically smaller for juveniles because of their distinct
characteristics. Given that children are less culpable the “...case for
retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”76 The
culpability of the juvenile in question with regards to lengthy minimum parole requirements for juveniles are even smaller because we
are only interested in non-homicide offenses. Culpability is central
to retributivism and because culpability is diminished for juveniles
especially those who committed non-homicidal offense, there is not
a legitimate retributivist justification.
Deterrence is the second justification the Court considers. Here
the idea is that harsher punishments deter people from committing
the crime because of the fear of punishment. The Court correctly
pointed out that the “same characteristics that render juveniles less
culpable… suggest that they will be less susceptible to deterrence.”77
Namely, juveniles are more likely to make rash decisions and often
do not consider the full effect of their actions. Given that this is
true, juveniles are not considering the potential punishment they
could receive when they decide whether to commit a crime. If the
punishment is not considered when choosing to commit the crime,
then deterrence is not at play. Here the penological justification is
weaker in part because it is less effective. This remains the case for
73
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lengthy minimum parole requirements. The same features that lead
us to believe that juveniles are different force the conclusions that
deterrence is not an adequate penological justification for juveniles.
Moreover, most juveniles likely do not even know the rules regarding parole. This means that it acts as even less of a deterrent. Some
may say that even with a weaker effect, the punishment still might
have acted as a deterrent for some juveniles. The Court responded to
this concern in Graham by saying that “even if punishment has some
connection to a penological goal it must be shown that punishment
is not grossly disproportionate in light of the justification offered.”78
This point is especially clear when looking at a separate hypothetical
example. Perhaps a state decided to sentence everyone who ignored
speeding laws to ten years in prison. This may cause some people
to stop speeding, but that does not automatically mean it is justified under deterrence as it is still “grossly disproportionate”79 for the
crime of speeding.
The third penological justification the Court considers is incapacitation. Incapacitation is largely concerned with mitigating the
effect of recidivism--the likelihood that people will commit crimes
again if they are released back into society. While the Court recognized recidivism as a serious risk and incapacitation as a legitimate
goal, it was still inadequate justification for juveniles who did not
commit homicide. Under incapacitation courts must justify the punishment “on the assumption that the juvenile offender will forever
be a danger to society.”80 For the same reasons that juveniles are different from adults, this judgment is especially fraught for juveniles.
Juveniles have an increased propensity for change and are more influenced by their surroundings then adults. Both factors make it incredibly difficult to actually judge when a juvenile is incorrigible. In a
similar way to life without parole, lengthy minimum parole requirements, make an extreme judgment about the juvenile. Furthermore,
juveniles who did not commit homicide show less of an inclination
towards the depravity needed to judge a juvenile as incorrigible. For
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this reason, “even if the States judgment…were later corroborated…
the sentence [is] still disproportionate because the judgment was
made at the outset.”81
Lastly the Court considers rehabilitative justifications. In both
Graham and Miller, the analysis on this point is easy. There is no
opportunity for the juvenile to be released if they are sentenced
to LWOP, so this “penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative
ideal.”82 This question deserves more consideration when the parole
option is available but only after a lengthy amount of time. The punishment does not appear to so bluntly forswear the rehabilitative ideal
at first glance, but upon closer inspection the same tenets emerge.
Rehabilitation engenders a respect for those that are incarcerated,
and that respect and hope enables change. If a juvenile cannot expect
even an opportunity for release until they are in their late-fifties or
later, how can that motivate change? They will not be motivated to
pick up meaningful skills as they will be passed the age to start a
career. They will not be encouraged to change for the potential of a
family because they are past the standard age for marriage and kids.
They will not be encouraged to change because they are given so
little of their lives to demonstrate that change. More than that, they
never had a chance for that life to begin with. Unlike adult offenders
who already had a chance for an education and a career and a family,
juvenile offenders often go to prison without even having a chance
to complete a high school education. At fifteen or sixteen or seventeen they are put into prison until they are almost sixty, and what
are their chances then? The Court recognized the impact of these
types of sentences on rehabilitation in Graham when they wrote:
“A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave
prison before life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible
individual.”83 Sentences with high minimum parole requirements for
juveniles cannot be justified by rehabilitative arguments.
Lengthy parole requirements are not justified under retributivism, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. This means that
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these sentencing schemes serve no practical penological purpose.
Given that the Court held in Graham that “a sentence lacking any
legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate
to the offense”, it becomes clear that lengthy parole requirements are
cruel and unusual.84
F. Meaningful Opportunity for Release
The Court also articulated one other concern regarding sentencing
for juveniles. Due to a juvenile’s unique status, a juvenile must be
allowed a meaningful opportunity for release. To be clear, this does
not mean that a state is required to “guarantee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender.”85 Instead, the Court ruled that states are required
to “give defendants like Graham a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”86 If a
juvenile’s first chance of release is in their late fifties, how can that
be considered a meaningful opportunity for release? These juveniles
lack skills that would be acquired outside prison. They also will have
a very hard time entering the workforce upon release. They will have
a criminal record, few marketable skills, and less time to devote to
the workforce. They will have missed the traditional time to build
a family. Even if they had a kid before going to prison, that child
would be forty by the time they were released and they would have
missed all chances to see their child grow up. They also would have
no conception of the outside world. Consider all the technological
and social changes that have occurred in the last forty years. Jimmy
Carter was the President of the United States forty years ago. Those
who truly should not be released because they are incorrigible, are
not guaranteed release. They have to meet parole standards much
like any other offender. All this rule would do is “forbid states from
making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be
fit to reenter society.87 It gives them a chance to change and to have
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that change translate into a meaningful opportunity for a life beyond
the mistakes they made when they were a child.

IV. A Categorical Solution
Given that lengthy parole requirements for juvenile non-homicide
offenders are unconstitutional, the Court could implement a variety of solutions. The Court should adopt a categorical rule against
sentencing schemes that allow juveniles first chance of parole to
be after thirty years of time served for non-homicide offenses. As
stated in Graham, where the Court also adopted a categorical rule
against LWOP for juveniles, “This clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that… sentences will be imposed on juvenile
non-homicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit
that punishment.”88 That is not to say that a categorical rule has no
problems. In Graham, the Court also recognized that “Categorical
rules tend to be imperfect” nonetheless, they held that “one [was]
necessary.”89 The fact that categorical rules are imperfect does not
justify their exclusion as a solution. Instead, following the pattern
of the Court, we have to look at the categorical rule in relation to
other solutions.
One solution is to allow the Court to consider age as a mitigating factor in determining sentencing. Florida argued in Graham
that this type of consideration met the standards of treating juveniles
as different that was set out in Roper.90 The Court held that while
statutes that see age as a mitigating factor are praise-worthy, they
are “nonetheless, by themselves insufficient to address the constitutional concerns at issue” because nothing in the “laws prevent[ed]
the courts from sentencing a juvenile non-homicide offender to life
without parole based on a subjective judgment” that the juvenile had
“an irretrievably depraved character.”91 In lengthy minimum parole
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requirements for juvenile non-homicide offenders, the sentencing
court must make a similar judgement. They must say that these
people are so depraved that the earliest they should be released is
at almost sixty years old. Also, this judgment is subjective because
of juveniles’ unique characteristics. It is very difficult to determine
who is incorrigible. As stated in Graham, these discretionary rules
are insufficient because they do not “prevent the possibility that the
offender will receive a life without parole sentence for which he or
she lacks the moral culpability.”92 Namely, these rules do not do
enough to protect juveniles from these unconstitutional sentences
when they are not justified.
There is also the case-by-case approach in which the Court
would give states strong guidance against the practice, but still allow
it to be used based on a set of standards. In Graham, the Court also
considered this approach, but ultimately concluded that even a caseby-case basis “must be confined by some boundaries.’’93 Even if we
assumed that there were cases where juveniles had sufficient maturity
and sufficient depravity to warrant these severe sentences, it is not
clear that courts could “with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity
for change.”94 Here again the analysis remains the same regarding
lengthy minimum parole requirements for non-homicide offenses.
There are likely the few that would deserve such an extreme sentence
with no serious hope of rehabilitation, but as the Court noted there
is no trustworthy way for courts to determine this at sentencing.
Moreover, barring lengthy minimum parole requirements does not
guarantee release of the more incorrigible offenders. It just provides
juveniles who do demonstrate change and rehabilitation a meaningful chance for release. The Court acknowledged this in Graham
when writing that “a categorical rule gives all juvenile non-homicide
offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”95
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The last concern is unique to an inquiry into lengthy minimum
parole requirements. Namely, why should the Court choose thirty
as the cut off for the categorical rule? This test would be what is
known as a bright-line standard where there is a clearly applicable
standard that can be applied to all cases. The Court has ruled that
when considering bright-line standards, the Court must weigh the
costs and benefits of such an approach.96 With lengthy minimum
parole requirements for non-homicide juvenile offenders, the line
must be set somewhere. For the Court to simply suggest a prohibition
for lengthy minimum parole requirements with no clearly applicable
standard, the issue would likely end up before the Court again later
as lower courts differed on how to interpret the issue without a clear
standard. Furthermore, as states crafted laws, they would have little
to no guidance in how to avoid litigation on their statutes. By setting the line at thirty, both states and lower courts would have clear
guidelines to follow.
The solution is not perfect. What if a state decided to set the
minimum parole requirement at twenty-nine years, thus satisfying
the bright-line rule? This does not seem to substantially differ from a
law with a thirty-year requirement, but one would be perfectly legal
and the other would be unconstitutional. This is a legitimate problem, and one would hope that states acting in good faith would not
adopt these types of statutes. That being said, by choosing thirty as
the line, the Court could mitigate some concerns. Thirty is at the
lower end of a minimum parole requirement. A juvenile sentenced
at seventeen would have their first chance for release at forty-seven.
While this reflects the concerns raised above, it is not as serious
as some of the forty or higher minimums allowed where release is
offered when the same juvenile would be offered release at almost
sixty. By picking the lower end of the scale, the Court could minimize the concerns with lengthy minimum parole requirements.
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V. Conclusion
The Court has now articulated in at least three different cases that
juvenile offenders are constitutionally different and that this must
be reflected in how courts sentence them. Lengthy minimum parole
requirements for non-homicide juvenile offenders fail to adequately
reflect juveniles’ unique status. This sentencing scheme is also not
nationally supported. In fact, only three states explicitly promote
this type of sentencing for juveniles. Additionally, because of juvenile’s unique status, the Supreme Court recognized that non-homicide juvenile offenders are categorically less culpable. Furthermore,
this type of sentencing is also very severe. Under this sentencing
scheme, a juvenile’s earliest possibility for parole could be into their
late fifties. This is well past the traditional time to have a family,
get a career, or find their way in the world. This sentencing denies
juveniles the hope that motivates change. Also, severe punishment,
under the Graham and Miller reasoning, serves no practical penological purpose. Considering all of these facts together, it is clear that
this type of sentencing denies juveniles the ability to change ‘without giving hope of restoration.”97 Subsequently, the Court should
hold that lengthy minimum parole requirements for non-homicide
juvenile offenders are unconstitutional.
If lengthy minimum parole requirements for non-homicide juvenile offenders are unconstitutional, what guidance should the Court
give lower courts in honoring this principle? The Court should adopt
a categorical rule because it prevents the possibility that this unconstitutional sentence will be imposed on juveniles. A categorical rule
works where a case-by-case approach would not because juveniles
are uniquely hard to classify as the type of incorrigible offenders that
warrant this type of extreme sentencing. A categorical rule prevents
this faulty judgement from denying juveniles their constitutional
rights. Furthermore, a categorical rule does not mean that incorrigible offenders are guaranteed release. If the parole board decides
that they did not demonstrate meaningful change, they would still
not be released. Thus, the categorical rule protects juveniles’ rights
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while still allowing for incorrigible juveniles to be held accountable.
Setting the line at thirty gives a specific sentencing structure for
lower Courts. Though not perfect, picking the lower end of the scale
for lengthy minimum parole requirements still mitigates the constitutional concerns raised in sentencing.
The United States is unique in its juvenile sentencing. It is one of
the few countries that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights
of the Child set forth by the U.N. in 1989, and even with the Court’s
limitations, the United States is the only country that still allows for
offenders under the age of 18 to be sentenced to life in prison without
parole.98 How a society treats children says important things about
who they are. By holding that lengthy minimum parole requirements
for juvenile non-homicide offenders are unconstitutional, the Court
would honor children in a way that is constitutionally relevant.
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